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1. Introduction
In recent years there has been remarkably subdued inflation despite
sharp rises in commodity prices, strong growth, and financial dis-
turbances. Global inflation rates fell from 30 percent a year to about
4 percent a year in the 1990s. At the same time, a massive globaliza-
tion process has swept emerging markets in Latin America, European
transition economies, and the East Asian emerging economies. The
establishment in 1992 of the Single Market in Europe, followed by the
formation of the single currency area in 1999, are also notable land-
marks of globalization over this period. Rogoff (2003, 2004) suggests
that this association of globalization and disinflation is not accidental.
While acknowledging that other favorable factors also helped drive
down global inflation in the 1990s, he conjectures that "globalization—
interacting with deregulation and privatization—has played a strong
supporting role in the past decade's disinflation."
1 The impact of glo-
balization on inflation will be temporary unless central banks change
their inflation target. That is, unless globalization affects the objective
function of the central bank.
Some empirical work supports Rogoff's conjecture. In early work,
Romer (1993,1998), and Lane (1997) showed that trade liberalization is
associated with lower inflation in large (flexible exchange rate) OECD
economies. More recently, Chen, Imbs, and Scott (2004) find, using dis-
aggregated data for EU manufacturing over the period 1988-2000, that
increased openness exerts a negative and significant impact on sectoral
prices. They show further that this effect of openness on prices occurs
both through lower markups and increases in productivity. Their results
suggest that the increase in the trade volume can account for as much
as a quarter of European disinflation over their sample period.172 Razin & Loungani
This paper explores the effects of globalization (namely, the open-
ing of a country to trade in goods and the liberalization of its interna-
tional capital markets) on the distortions associated with fluctuations in
the output gap and the inflation rate, in a sticky price, New Keynesian
model. The analysis shows how globalization alters the relative weights
applied to the output gap and the inflation surprise in a utility-based
loss function. The mechanism at play, not yet addressed by the existing
literature, relies on the consumption-smoothing properties of capital
market integration and the de-linking of the commodity composition of
consumption spending from the commodity composition of domestic
output, that characterize specialization in production under the goods
market integration. These features of openness help reduce distor-
tions associated with output gap fluctuations, while not affecting, to
a first approximation, the inefficiency associated with fluctuations in
inflation.
This theory provides a new way of interpreting the evidence on the
effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio. It suggests that the forces of
globalization could induce monetary authorities, guided in their poli-
cies by the welfare criterion of a representative household, into putting
greater emphasis on reducing the inflation rate than on narrowing out-
put gaps.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 provides a derivation of the closed-economy utility-
based loss function from the viewpoint of the conventional expected
utility maximization by the representative household. Sections 4 and 5
extend the derivation of the utility-based loss function to open econo-
mies. Section 6 provides evidence on the effect of openness on the equi-
librium output-inflation tradeoffs. Section 7 concludes.
2. Analytical Framework
The analytical framework draws on the New Keynesian macroeconom-
ics literature as in Woodford (2003). Main features of the model are as
follows.
(1) There is a representative household whose utility is defined over
consumption and leisure, as in standard micro-based welfare analysis.
(2) The domestic economy produces a continuum of varieties. The
decisions of the representative household are governed by Dixit-Sti-
glitz preferences over varieties (generating fixed elasticities). Purchas-Globalization and Equilibrium Inflation-Output Tradeoffs 173
ing power parity condition prevails and foreign firms' prices are taken
as exogenous.
(3) A proportion of producers sets domestic currency denominated
prices, one period in advance; the remaining proportion sets flexibly
the domestic currency denominated prices, so that markets clear for
these goods.
(4) The representative household's welfare depends on consumption
and labor supply. From this standard construction we derive a qua-
dratic loss function, which depends on the output gap and inflation
surprise.
3. The Model
Assume that the welfare criterion, from which a quadratic utility-based
loss function is to be derived, is the standard expected utility of a repre-
sentative household, given by:
t=o
Where,
Aggregate consumption, Cf, is an index of differentiated products:
Labor supply for a product variety; is denoted by ht(j). The production
function of variety; is given by Atf(ht(j). The vector (At, %t) represents
productivity and preference shocks. The u(Ct; %t) function is concave
in C, so that the consumer wants to smooth consumption fluctuations.
The m(ht(j); t^ function is convex in h, so that the consumer prefers
equality in the supply of labor across different varieties to cross-variety
dispersion in the labor supply.
Aggregate domestic output is specified as174 Razin & Loungani
If the economy is open to trade in goods, the number of domesti-
cally produced varieties is smaller than the number of domestically
consumed varieties; i.e., trade-induced specialization in production.
Thus, the commodity composition of the consumption basket is differ-
ent from the commodity composition of the output basket. As a result,
the correlation between fluctuations in output and consumption, which
is perfect in the case of a closed economy, is less than perfect when the
economy is opened to trade in goods. When the economy is financially
open, output fluctuations are inter-temporally separated from con-
sumption fluctuations, due to the consumption-smoothing property
of international capital flows. Therefore these two types of openness
result in a separation beetween output fluctuations and consumption
fluctuations; the latter are the object of welfare evaluations, but not the
former.
3.1 Price Setting
Firms behave monopolistically in the goods markets, and, at the same
time, monopsonistically in the labor market (because producer ; is the
sole demander for labor of type-; and household supply of type-/ labor
is perfectively competitive).
2 A fraction y of the monopolistically com-
petitive firms sets their prices flexibly at plt, supplying ylt; whereas
the remaining fraction 1 - y sets their prices one period in advance
(in period t - 1) at p2t, supplying y2t. In the flexible price case, price is
marked up above the marginal cost, s, by the factor:
so that,
In the rigid price case, p2t is set so as to maximize expected dis-
counted profits subject to an implicit producer-consumer contract
in which the producer supplies the entire demand that is realized at
any state of nature. Thus, the price-setting rule for p2t is obtained by






w, determines the overall demand for goods, as stan-
dard per open economies. Inverting the production function yields:
Substituting the demand function into the inverted function yields:
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The first order condition is then given by:
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The symbol z"w stands for the nominal rate of interest in period t - 1.
How can one interpret the first-order condition? In the special case
of perfect certainty, this is nothing but the standard equation describ-
ing price as a mark-up over marginal cost. With uncertainty, it becomes
a weighted average of state-dependent mark-ups over marginal cost.
Price is pre-determined by expectations of next period demand and
costs, but the firm is committed to supplying quantities according to
the actual realizations of demand and costs. That is, the realization of
demand and supply shocks will affect actual output, with negative
shocks leading to excess capacity and positive shocks to under-capac-
ity. The model predicts that the mark-ups of the producers who pre-
set their prices will be counter-cyclical. Negative demand shocks will
induce the flex-price firms to adjust their prices downward, diverting
demand away, and thus lowering the marginal costs of the flex-price
firms and lowering mark-ups of the fixed-price firms.176 Razin & Loungani
Figure 1 describes equilibrium in one labor market. The downward-
sloping marginal-productivity curve represents the demand for labor.
The supply of labor, Sh, is implicitly determined by the utility-maximizing
condition for h. The upward-sloping marginal factor cost curve is the mar-
ginal change from the producer monopsonistically point of view. It lies
above the supply curve because, in order to elicit more hours of work, the
producer has to offer a higher wage not only to that (marginal) hour but
also to all the (infra-marginal) existing hours. Equilibrium employment
occurs at a point where the marginal factor costs is equal to the marginal
productivity of labor. Equilibrium wage is given by B, with the worker's
real wage marked down below marginal product by the distance AB.
Full employment obtains because workers are offered a wage accord-
ing to their supply schedule. This is why the aggregate supply curve
will be stated in terms of excess capacity (which corresponds to the
product market version of the Phillips curve) rather than unemploy-
ment (the labor market version of the Phillips curve).
3
3.2 Transforming the Utility Function to a Loss Function
We now derive the quadratic loss function from a standard welfare cri-
terion of a representative household, following Woodford (2003).
4 We
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We employ the production function, yt = Atf(ht), j = 1,2, and transform
period t utility function, as follows.
Nominal marginal cost is:
Dividing through by Pt we get real marginal cost:
Labor supply is implicitly given by
-™JL v_
u(C Z) P
One can use the above conditions to get a reduced-form expression for
the real marginal costs, as follows.
where, v and uc denote the marginal disutility of labor and the mar-
ginal utility of consumption, respectively.
The elasticity of v (y(j); %, A) with respect to y is denoted by
Vy(Y)
The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is denoted by
To allow for stationarity in the stochastic process of consumption we
assume that178 Razin & Loungani
This implies a zero consumption growth rate in the deterministic steady
state because in this case the familiar saving rule,
reduces to Ct = C. Upper bars denote the deterministic steady state.
3.3 Output Gap
We denote the output gap by x:
x = Y - Y
N
xt it it .
A "hat" denotes a proportional deviation from steady state, and a
superscript N indicates flexible price equilibrium. That is, Yt is equal
to deviations of actual output from its steady state level whereas Yt
N
is equal to deviations of potential output from its steady state level.
Potential output is defined as the level of output the economy would
produce if all prices and wages are fully flexible.
A different measure for an output gap in the steady state has to do
with the monopolistic-competition distortion. In the shock-free steady
state, the level of output, Y, is implicitly given by:
s(C, Y; 0,1) = vy (Y; 0,1) / uc (C; 0) = -,
Recall that the mark up is defined in terms of the cross-variety elasticity
of substitution, ju - 6/6-1. The efficient (zero mark up) output in the
shock-free steady state, Y*, is implicitly given by:
s(C*,Y*;0,l) = 1.
The monopolistically based output gap measure is defined by the
ratio of the flexible price monopolistic-competition output and the effi-
cient output; namely
Y/Y*.
Log-approximation of the supply-side equations yields:
x* = log( Y/Y*) =-(« + a"
1) -.
Thus, the monopolistic output gap in logs, x* is an increasing function
of the markup.Globalization and Equilibrium Inflation-Output Tradeoffs 179
4. Globalization and Efficiency
As is well known, when the economy opens up to trade in goods, it
tends to specialize in production and to diversify in consumption. This
means that the number of domestically produced varieties, equal to
n, is less than the number of domestically consumed varieties. Conse-
quently, the commodity composition of the consumption basket and
the commodity composition of the output basket, that were identical
in a closed economy, would diverge when the economy opens up. As a
result, the correlation between fluctuations in output and consumption,
which is equal to one in the case of a closed economy, falls short of one
if the economy is opened to international trade in goods.
When the economy also becomes financially open, domestic con-
sumption spending and domestic output typically diverge for a sepa-
rate reason. The household can smooth aggregate consumption through
international borrowing and lending. Hence, the aggregate output sto-
chastic path diverges from the aggregate consumption path.
The upshot is that in both cases of openness, albeit for different rea-
sons, the correlation between the fluctuations in the output gap and
the fluctuations in aggregate consumption are significantly reduced.
Because consumer welfare depends on consumption, not on output,
the weight of the output gap in the loss function falls with both trade
and capital openness. In what follows we formalize this intuition.
4.1 International Mobility of Capital and Goods
If capital is perfectly mobile, the domestic agent has a costless access
to the international financial market. The saving rule, uc(Ct) = /?(1 +
rt)Et(uc(Ct+l)), where rt equals the world risk free interest rate, implies that the representative consumer can smooth all the fluctuations in con-
sumption that are caused by shocks to the domestic economy's out-
put. In the neighborhood of the shock-free steady state, consumption
smoothing is almost perfect and consumption growth has no trend
because we assume J3= 1/1 + 7. Thus, when the capital account is open
and perfect consumption smoothing is achieved, the equilibrium pro-
portional deviations of consumption from the steady state level are
approximately the same in the fixed-price and flexible-price cases. That
is,
C =C
N180 Razin & Loungani
If goods are perfectly mobile, the number of product varieties is reduced
from the closed-trade number of one to n. The approximate utility-
based loss function for open-capital and open-trade regimes is:
L = {nt -Ef ,nt) + (xt - x*) + residual
Distortions in the new Keynesian equilibrium can be grouped into
two types:
(1) Consumption fluctuations are welfare-reducing, therefore output
gap fluctuations, which are correlated with consumption fluctuations,
are also welfare-reducing.
(2) An efficient allocation of the supply of labor across product varieties
is to allocate labor equally across varieties because varieties have the
same technologies and preferences concerning varieties are symmet-
ric. Thus, any cross-variety output dispersion is welfare-reducing. An
increase in unanticipated inflation rates, given that some prices are set
in advance, would raise the labor supply dispersion. Hence, also, the
unanticipated inflation is welfare-reducing.
The associated aggregate supply relationship (see Razin and Yuen
(2002)) is:
\-n
The term e is the proportional deviation of the real exchange rate from
its corresponding steady state level, Y
ft is the proportional deviation of
the rest-of-the-world output from its corresponding steady state level,
and 1- n denotes the number of imported goods. Note that the rela-
tive weight that is placed upon the output gap term (normalizing the
weight of the quadratic deviations of the inflation rate to one), is also
equal to the (aggregate-supply based) sacrifice ratio times the inverse
of the cross-variety elasticity of substitution, which is inversely propor-
tional to the mark up of the flexible price firms.Globalization and Equilibrium Inflation-Output Tradeoffs 181
The intuition for this is that the quadratic approximation to the util-
ity function is derived from the original utility function by using the
relation between nominal prices and real supply, which is based on the
aggregate supply block of the macroeconomic model. This means that
there is a direct link between the sacrifice ratio and the relative weight
of the output gap term in the loss function, holding constant the flex-
ible-price mark up,
4.2 Closed Capital Account and Open Trade Account
If the domestic economy does not participate in the international finan-
cial market, then there is clearly no possibility of consumption smooth-











The approximate utility-based loss function becomes
7:
Lt = (nt -Et_jttY+--
1 — (xt -x*) + residual.
tf 1 — y l + cot)
4.3 Closed Economy
Under both trade and financial autarky (all the goods in the domestic
consumption index are produced domestically), n = 1, because the com-
modity composition of the output and the consumption baskets are the
same, and ct = yt; ct
N = yt
N. Consumption spending must equal output in
the fixed price and the flexible price economies. The approximate util-
ity-based loss function becomes:182 Razin & Loungani




 CJ (xt - x*)
2 + residual.
5. Weights in the Loss Function
The relative weight attached to the output-gap term (recall: the unex-
pected-inflation weight is normalized to one) in each one of the open-
ness scenarios is given by:
1 YTIQ)
(1) w, = (Open Capital and Trade Accounts)
V
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One can verify that y/^K \//2< y/y
9
That is, the weight of the output-gap term in the utility-based loss
function falls with openness. This result follows from the consumption-
smoothing and trade-specialization intuitions presented in the previ-
ous subsection.
A simple one-period optimization problem of the central bank can
serve to illustrate the finding that openness triggers more aggressive
anti-inflation policy. Assume that the central bank minimizes the level
of the utility-based quadratic loss function, subject to the aggregate
supply constraint.
1
0 The resulting equilibrium trade-off is:
(E) (*) (7CtEt_1nt) (xtx)
where SR denotes the sacrifice ratio, and 1/6 is proportional to the
flexible-price mark up. The inverse of the sacrifice ratio is equal to
1 yncoGlobalization and Equilibrium Inflation-Output Tradeoffs 183
or
1 y(co + C7"
1)
in the three cases of perfect international mobility of capital and goods,
perfect mobility of goods but no mobility of capital, and no mobility
of either goods or capital, respectively. That is, for any given level of
the output gap, the equilibrium inflation surprise is lower as the
economy becomes more open. In sum, the optimizing monetary rule
implies that the central bank would become more aggressive with
respect to inflation, as the economy opens up to trade in goods and
flows of capital.
The de-facto output-inflation tradeoff characterizes the relative
weight in the loss function which the policy maker puts on inflation.
This consideration enables us to use the estimated general-equilibrium
sacrifice ratio as an indicator for the de-facto weight of the output gap
in the unobserved utility-based loss function. In the next section we
review some empirical evidence on the association between the sacri-
fice ratio and openness.
1
1
6. Globalization and the Sacrifice Ratio: Empirical Evidence
We present in this section some additional evidence on the impact of
openness on equilibrium sacrifice ratios.
1
2 Our regressions focus on
explaining the determinants of sacrifice ratios as measured by Ball. He
starts out by identifying disinflations episodes, in which the trend infla-
tion rate fell substantially. Ball identifies 65 such disinflation episodes in
19 OECD countries, over the period 1960 to 1987. For each one of these
episodes he calculates the associated sacrifice ratio; the denominator of
the sacrifice ratio being the change in trend inflation over an episode.
The numerator of the Ball sacrifice ratio is the sum of output losses,
the deviations between actual output and its trend ("full employment"
level).
We also take from Ball data on determinants of the sacrifice ratios
such as the initial level of inflation, the change in inflation over the
course of the episode and the length of the disinflation episode.
Measuring the degree of openness of trade and capital accounts is
always a heroic task. Since 1950, the IMF has issued an annual publi-184 Razin & Loungani
cation, which tries to describe the controls that its member countries
have in place on various current account capital transactions. However,
as Cooper (1999, p. Ill) notes, these descriptions are very imperfect
measures of the extent of capital-market restrictions, particularly for
the case of the capital account:
"... Restrictions on international capital transactions ... come in infinite vari-
ety. Therefore an accurate portrayal requires knowledge not only of the laws
and regulations in place, but also of how they are implemented—which often
requires much official discretion—and of how easily they are circumvented,
either legally or illegally. The IMF reports the presence of restrictions, but not
their intensity or their impact."
Quinn (1997) takes the basic IMF qualitative descriptions on the pres-
ence of restrictions and translates them into a quantitative measure of
restrictions using certain coding rules. This translation provides a mea-
sure of the intensity of restrictions on current account transactions on
a (0, 8) scale and restrictions on capital account transactions on a (0, 4)
scale; in both cases, a higher number indicates fewer restrictions. We use
the Quinn measures, labeled CURRENT and CAPITAL, respectively, as
our measures of restrictions. We also use the sum of the two measures,
as an overall measure of the degree of restrictions on the openness of the
economy; this measure is labeled OPEN. An econometrics advantage of
using rule-based openness dummies over trade flows (e.g., the import
to output ratios) and capital flows in the regression analysis has to do
with the endogeneity problem associated with the latter measures).
For each one of the disinflation episodes identified by Ball, we use
as an independent variable, the current account and capital account
restrictions that were in place the year before the start of the episode.
This at least makes the restrictions pre-determined with respect to the
sacrifice ratios, though of course not necessarily fully exogenous.
6.1 Regressions
The first column of Table 1 reports a regression of the sacrifice ratio on
initial inflation, the length of the episode (measured in quarters) and
the change in inflation over the course of the episode. Not surprisingly,
as all the data were taken from Ball's study, the results are qualitatively
similar and quantitatively virtually identical to regressions reported in
his paper. The key finding is that sacrifice ratios are smaller, the quickerGlobalization and Equilibrium Inflation-Output Tradeoffs 185
Table 1
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Change in inflation during episode
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CAPITAL
Index of capital account restrictions
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is the speed with which the disinflation is undertaken. The change in
inflation also enters with the predicted sign and is significant (t = 1.8,
p-value = .076). Initial inflation is insignificant (but has the wrong sign
from the perspective of the theory).
Now consider the impact of adding the measures of openness, which
are shown in the next three regressions. Ball's findings continue to
hold. The length of the episode and the decline in inflation become
more significant, while initial inflation remain insignificant. The mea-
sures of openness enter with the positive sign predicted by the theory.
The effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio is statistically significant,
as reflected also in the perking up of the adjusted R-square of the three
regressions when compared to the first. The restrictions on the current
account appear statistically more significant than the restrictions on the
capital account. When we entered both CURRENT and CAPITAL in the
regression, CURRENT remained significant but CAPITAL did not. The
correlation between the two variables is almost 0.5; hence, our inability
to tease out separate effects is not entirely surprising.186 Razin & Loungani
What the estimation method of the sacrifice ratio can deliver is an
estimate of the equilibrium inflation-output trade off. It reflects both
policymaker preference and aggregate supply conditions. Thus, the
regressions in Table 1 provide some additional support to the notion
that that relative weight, in equilibrium, of the inflation in the loss func-




This paper puts forward an efficiency argument for putting heavier
weight on inflation, relative to output gap, in a utility-based loss func-
tion, as the economy opens up. With capital account liberalization the
representative household is able to smooth fluctuations in consumption,
and thus becomes relatively insensitive to fluctuations in the output gap.
With trade liberalization the economy tends to specialize in production
and diversify in consumption. The correlation between the fluctuations
in the output gap and aggregate consumption is therefore weakened by
trade openness; hence a smaller weight on the output gap in the utility-
based loss function, compared to the closed economy situations.
The theory is based on a new mechanism of how globalization forces
induce monetary authorities, guided in their policies by the welfare
criterion of a representative household, to put greater emphasis on
reducing the inflation rate than on narrowing the output gaps (see Gali
and Monacelli (2005), Paoli (2004), and Benigno and Benigno (2003)).
As noted by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983),
and Rogoff (1985), central banks have an incentive to deviate from their
pre-announced monetary rule, generating an inflation bias. Globaliza-
tion lessens such temptation that leads to this bias because the central
banker is less sensitive to output gap fluctuations. The theory provides
a new way to interpret existing evidence of the empirical relationships
between openness and the sacrifice ratio. Although the reduced-form
evidence cannot sharply discriminate between alternative hypotheses,
it is consistent with the theory's prediction that goods and capital mar-
kets' openness decreases the distortions associated with fluctuations in
the output gap, while leaving unaffected, to a first approximation, the
distortion associated with fluctuations in inflation.
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Notes
1. See Appendix 1 for a description of trends in monetary policy and openness in the last
two decades.
2. An alternative assumption is that producers behave competitively in a segmented
labor market. This would not qualitatively change the results.
3. In fact, the model can also accommodate unemployment by introducing a labor union,
which has monopoly power to bargain on behalf of the workers with the monopsonistic
employer over the equilibrium wage. In this case, the equilibrium wage will lie some-
where between Sh and the marginal product schedule and unemployment can arise, so
that the labor market version of the Phillips curve can be derived as well. To simplify the
analysis, we assume in this paper that the workers are wage-takers. In the limiting case
where the producers behave perfectly competitively in the labor market, the real wage
becomes equal to the marginal productivity of labor and the marginal cost of labor curve
is not sensitive to output changes. Thus, with a constant mark-up, 6/6- 1, the aggregate
supply curve becomes flat. That is, there exists no relation between inflation and excess
capacity.
4. See a closed economy derivation in Appendix II.
5. All the elasticities are evaluated at the point:
C = CY=Y B= ,
1 + r
and 7 denotes the world rate of interest.
6. Log-linearizing the closed capital-account equality PC = P Y yields:
C = Y-(P-PY)
(P- PY) = (1 - n)((ep *) - PY) = (1 - n) eY
where,
and
(P-PY) = (l-n)((ep*)-PY) = (l-n)eY.
7. In this case, the aggregate-supply curve is given by:
8. The aggregate supply schedule is:




9. Note we implicitly assume that the price-setting fractions (y, 1 - f) across the dif-
ferent openness scenarios are the same; empirically this assumption can be relaxed.
Also, the open economy steady state elasticities are assumed to be equal to the closed
economy steady state elasticities. There is however no theory that can explain the fixed-
flexible pricing structure for a closed economy; or one that can rationalize how the
pricing structure changes in the presence of globalization. Thus we also do not know how188 Razin & Loungani
globalization affects the structure of price setting behavior by firms. The globalization
proposition we just proved is therefore conditional on exogenous determination of the
price-setting fractions {y,\-fi across the different openness scenarios. The flexible price
mark up term, 1/ 0, is also assumed to be unaffected by the openness regime.
10. We focus here on the inflation-output tradeoff. In the quadratic loss function minimi-
zation problem the residual additive term in the loss function, residual, which is different
across regimes, is essentially ignored. Therefore, the policy optimization problem yields
the same equilibrium functional relationship between the equilibrium values of surprise
inflation and the output gap, in each one of the three regimes.
11. Because the relative weight of the output gap term in the utility-based loss func-
tion is equal to 1/6 times the sacrifice ratio, a working assumption that we make is that
the parameter 1 / 6 is uncorrelated, across the disinflation episodes, with the measures of
openness.
12. Using Ball's (1994) sacrifice ratio estimates, Temple (2002) finds only a weak relation-
ship between import-output ratios (as a measure of trade openness) and the sacrifice ratio
in a cross-country analysis. However, his use of the (non-instrumented) import-output
ratio as openness measures in the regressions raises acute issues of endogeneity. Indeed,
when Daniels, Nourzad, and Vanhoose (2005) augment Temple's regressions with a mea-
sure of central bank independence, which allows them to condition on the interaction
between central bank independence and the measure of trade openness, they find there
is a positive and statistically significant relationship between trade openness and the sac-
rifice ratio.
13. Results are consistent with Loungani, Razin, and Yuen (2001) and Daniels, Nourzad,
and Vanhoose (2005). See also Appendix 1 for indirect evidence on the linkage between
globalization and tightness of monetary policy.
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Appendix I: Globalization and Disinflation—Recent Trends
Sgherri (2002) reports the parameter estimates for a monetary model for the
U.S. economy, both for the high inflation period (1970Q1-1982Q1, hereafter the
1970s) and the subsequent move to the low inflation (1982Q2 onward) period.
Similar results are obtained for other industrial countries with independent
monetary policies included in the sample (Canada, Germany, and the United
Kingdom). The parameter estimates indicate that—since 1982—policymak-
ers have become significantly more aggressive on inflation, less responsive
to the output gap, and more gradualist in adjusting their policy instruments.
Benati (2004) investigates the changing nature of the Phillips relationship in the
United Kingdom, with a flattening taking place in the 1980s and a particularly
high degree of stability since the adoption of inflation targeting. International
financial integration and the making of the single European market are other
possible contributing factors.
Trade openness, as measured by a reduction in levels of assistance afforded
to domestic industries through protectionist trade policies have raised: the pro-
tectionist policies have gradually fallen over the past 40 years. The average
level of tariffs and the incidence of use of NTBs in most OECD countries for
which data is available reached relatively low levels by the mid-1990s. Trends
in the use of NTBs, as measured by incidence and frequency of use of NTBs, are
shown in Table Al.
Controls on cross-border capital flows encompass a diversified set of mea-
sures. Typically, capital controls take two broad forms: (1) "administrative,"
Table Al
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involving outright prohibitions; and (2) "market based that attempt to discour-
age particular capital movements by making them more expensive, through
taxation." Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) study the progress of financial lib-
eralization (reducing policy barriers to the purchase and sale of assets across
national borders) over 1972-1999 periods in both the G-7 industrial economies
and various regional sub-groups in the developing world. They prepared a com-
posite index of liberalization of various segments of financial markets, includ-
ing the capital accounts, domestic financial systems, and stock markets. They
found that during the period under review removal of financially repressive
measures was slow but continuous globally. They also concluded that the G-7
industrial economies were the first and the rapidest to liberalize their financial
sectors. The rise in financial flows among industrial countries has enabled the
United States to become both the world's largest creditor and its largest debtor,
while financial flows to developing countries have remained steady at about 4
percent of the developing country GDP. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) observe
that both Portugal and Greece have been running large current account deficits,
with no effect on their financial ratings. Starting from this observation, they
argue that Portugal and Greece are in fact representative of a broader evolution:
Increasing goods and financial market integration is leading to an increasing
decoupling of saving and investment within the European Union, and even
more so within the Euro area. In particular, it is allowing poorer countries to
invest more, save less, and run larger current-account deficits. The converse
holds for the richer countries.
Appendix II: Closed Economy Quadratic Loss Function
The quadratic approximation of the utility function, around the steady state, in




r, yjt = y[ylt - Ej yjt f + (1 - y)[y2i - Ej yjt f
The terms var yt(j) and E.yt(j) denote cross-variety output variance and aver-
age output, respectively.192 Razin & Loungani
Note that the term (co + <r
l)(xt - x*)
1 originates from the sub-utility [u(Yt;£t))].
The term (co + 0"
1) var yt(j) originates from the labor disutility
j\(yt(j);$t,At)dj .
The familiar Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over the differentiated goods (varieties)
imply
Taking logarithms yields:
log yt(j) = log Yt - ©(log pt(j) - log P).
The derived cross-variety variance is:
var,
 log y,(j) = °
2
 var;
We can now substitute these derivations into equation (Al). The approximate




l){*f e(l d)\{j)}. (A2)
We now exploit the rational-expectation property of mark up pricing and
express the price index in logarithms, as follows.
log Pt = y log plt+(l-y) log p2t.
These equations imply that:
n\ -Et_1nt = r[logplf -Ef_! log Pi J
This step, in turn, yields:
var; log pjt = /(I - r)[log plt - log p2t f = —
y- [nt - Et_lnt f.
Substituting this relationship into equation (A2) we get the closed economy
loss function:
Lt = (nt - E(_^f)
2 + \ ^— ^r-^-(xt - x*)
2 + residual (A3)
where,